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Abstract: Brain–computer interfaces (BCIs) are driven essentially by algorithms; however, 
the ethical role of such algorithms has so far been neglected in the ethical assessment of BCIs. 
The goal of this article is therefore twofold: First, it aims to offer insights into whether (and 
how) the problems related to the ethics of BCIs (e.g., responsibility) can be better grasped 
with the help of already existing work on the ethics of algorithms. As a second goal, the 
article explores what kinds of solutions are available in that body of scholarship, and how 
these solutions relate to some of the ethical questions around BCIs. In short, the article asks 
what lessons can be learned about the ethics of BCIs from looking at the ethics of algorithms. To 
achieve these goals, the article proceeds as follows. First, a brief introduction into the algo-
rithmic background of BCIs is given. Second, the debate about epistemic concerns and the 
ethics of algorithms is sketched. Finally, this debate is transferred to the ethics of BCIs.
Keywords: brain–computer interface; ethics of algorithms; responsibility
Introduction
During the last decade, not only has the technological development around brain–
computer interfaces (BCIs) advanced, but so also has the ethical and philosophical 
preoccupation with the implications of connecting brains to machines.1,2,3 Sasha 
Burwell, Matthew Sample, and Eric Racine identify issues of user safety and 
risk–benefit analysis, humanity and personhood, stigma, autonomy and self-
determination, responsibility, research ethics and informed consent, privacy, and 
security as well as justice as the main concerns that ethicists have identified so far.4 
Of particular importance is the question that some authors have debated using the 
term “responsibility gap” to suggest that responsibility for harm caused by BCIs 
might be difficult to ascribe.5,6,7,8,9,10,11
The potential responsibility gap arises because control over the BCI-mediated 
action is shared between the user and a computer. This makes it difficult to discern 
whether a particular action can be traced back to a human or to the machine. 
Existing answers to the potential responsibility gap often point to other domains 
of technology, in which comparable issues have emerged, whereas other scholars 
propose modifications to the concept of responsibility itself, in order to face the 
gap. However, none of the previous discussions take a sufficiently close look at the 
technology itself; that is, at the use of algorithms. Algorithms are mathematical 
constructs that run a program or device to solve given tasks, and that are imple-
mentable in various technologies.12,13 Some algorithms also employ machine-
learning techniques; that is, they do not perform preprogrammed decisionmaking 
steps, but change their decisionmaking rules autonomously.
Nonetheless, engaging with the question of algorithms is essential for obtaining 
fundamental answers to the responsibility question and other ethical issues, because 
The authors thank Mary Clare O’Donnell for her valuable support in preparing the manuscript.
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the computer control in BCI activities is essentially based on algorithms. We will, 
therefore, follow up on the observation that the algorithm-based technology 
behind BCIs is connected to epistemic concerns that need further analysis, in order 
to gain new insights into the responsibility question, and also into ethical issues 
that have been the focus of BCI ethicists. By “epistemic concerns,” we mean con-
cerns that relate to the way algorithms produce actionable insights or knowledge. 
Because algorithms relate input from the human brain to an output device (see 
subsequent discussion), epistemic concerns deal with the information algorithmi-
cally generated about the brain activity, its algorithmic interpretation, and trans-
mission to the output channel.
Therefore, the goal of this article is twofold: First, it aims to seek whether (and 
how) the problems related to the ethics of BCIs can be better grasped with the help 
of the ethics of algorithms. Its second goal is to see what kinds of solutions are 
available in that body of scholarship, and how these solutions relate to BCIs.14 In 
short, we want to inquire what lessons can be learned about the ethics of BCIs 
from looking at the ethics of algorithms. This field of inquiry deals with the ethical 
issues that arise out of the development, design, and use of algorithms for a vari-
ety of purposes. It has recently emerged as an attempt to grasp the fact that human 
interaction in and with the world is increasingly mediated by algorithms that pose 
distinct ethical questions.
To achieve these goals, we proceed as follows. First, a brief introduction into the 
algorithmic background of BCIs is given in the next section. Second, the debate about 
epistemic concerns and the ethics of algorithms is sketched in the third section. Third 
and finally, this debate is transferred to the ethics of BCIs in the fourth section.
Algorithms in BCIs
A BCI is essentially a system that translates brain activity into actionable output 
commands for a technological device. BCIs consist of four elements.15
 
 1)  The generation of brain signals by the user. Typically, BCIs are divided into 
three categories:16 active BCIs in which the user intentionally produces cer-
tain brain states (e.g., motor imagery) that the BCIs learn to connect with the 
intended output; reactive BCIs in which the user is presented with certain 
(mostly visual or auditive) stimuli while the BCI measures a particular reactive 
brain signal; and passive BCIs in which the user’s brain activity is monitored 
and action is taken as soon as a predefined state occurs.
 2)  The measurement of these signals, using various instruments such as elec-
troencephalography (EEG), magnetoencephalography (MEG), or functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
 3)  The decoding of the measured brain signals; that is, the identification of the 
relevant aspects of the signal, and the classification according to the brain 
activity of interest
 4)  The output commands that direct a given external device (e.g., a wheelchair 
or a computer)
 
In the functioning of a BCI, algorithms can be found throughout several steps. 
First, the extraction and classification of brain signals makes use of (machine-
learning) algorithms.17 Only with effective algorithms can the preprocessed brain 
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data be classified to enable spelling for communication-disabled patients.18,19 The 
challenge is, as some authors note,20 to find algorithms that extract features in a 
reliable way.
Second, algorithms are again utilized to initiate the performance of certain 
actions autonomously, based on the data received.
Third, algorithms tend also to be used to initiate actions self-reliantly, in order to 
enhance BCI usage when the user is unable or unwilling to perform accurate 
brain-based controlling operations. Pim Haselager21 uses the example of a BCI-
directed wheelchair that autonomously drives around obstacles, and Rafael Yuste, 
Sara Goering, Blaise Agüera y Arcas, Guoqiang Bi, Jose M. Carmena, Adrian 
Carter et al.22 reason about a possible “auto-complete” or “auto-correct’ function.” 
This use of algorithms is dependent on combining brain data with other informa-
tion (e.g., about the external world and the larger context of action).
Given the centrality of algorithms in BCI use on the one hand, and the numer-
ous ethical questions raised with regard to BCIs on the other hand, it appears 
natural to inquire what role algorithms play in the ethics of BCIs.
The Ethics of Algorithms: On How to Create Transparency
Brent Mittelstadt, Patrick Allo, Mariarosaria Taddeo, Sandra Wachter and Luciano 
Floridi offer an overview of concerns with regard to the use of algorithms across 
a multitude of contexts (e.g., credit rating in banking, prediction of recidivism in 
judicial sentencing and predictive policing more generally).23 According to these 
authors, an algorithm is used to provide evidence on which an action is taken, 
generically speaking. This evidence, however, can either be inconclusive, inscru-
table, or misguided. In other words, algorithms suffer from epistemic problems 
concerning the nature of algorithmic evidence. Moreover, the use of algorithms for 
decisionmaking can lead to social discrimination and affects notions such as pri-
vacy and autonomy. And finally, the general issue of traceability is mentioned as a 
source of concerns with algorithms. For the present purpose it is useful to closely 
examine the impact of these epistemic concerns on the use of BCIs, because the 
epistemic dimension of BCIs are considered to contribute to the emergence of a 
responsibility gap in BCI use.
Assessing the Ethics of Algorithms
The first epistemic concern holds that the connection between the production 
of evidence and the resulting conclusion might be inscrutable.24 Inscrutability or 
opacity can derive from intentional hiding (e.g., because of competition on the mar-
ket), from people’s inability to technically understand programming and algorithms, 
or from the nature of algorithms and their high dimensionality and complexity. 
Algorithms are often judged as black boxes because, especially in machine-learning 
algorithms, the working mechanisms are opaque, even to experts.
Second, the evidence generated by algorithms can be inconclusive. There is an 
inevitable amount of uncertainty attached to the conclusion drawn from the data 
an algorithm uses, because, in essence, algorithms typically detect correlations 
between variables, but rarely causation.25 Imagine the case of correlating one’s 
place of living and one’s financial situations: credit rating algorithms take this 
correlation (which is not a causal relation) as an indicator of one’s potential to 
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pay back. However, these kinds of correlations might be spurious, as many authors 
maintain.26
Third, epistemic worries arise because the quality of an algorithm’s output 
depends on the data that serve as input (“misguided evidence”). If the data are 
misguided, so is the resulting conclusion, it seems. The term “misguided” in this 
context refers to biases on the part of those who design and implement these algo-
rithms. Biases can enter an algorithm as the result of a designer’s or user’s decision 
(e.g., when automated surveillance incorporates the values and biases of law 
enforcement authorities), but they can also be technologically driven (e.g., when 
flaws in the data reoccur in the resulting conclusions), or represent an emergent 
phenomenon linked to new contexts of use (e.g., when clinical decision-support 
systems [CDSSs] can only recommend treatments that are within its database).
Where Are the Problems?
There a number of problems related to these issues. Opacity or lack of transpar-
ency in algorithms’ data mining or decisionmaking, for example, decreases trust 
in algorithms and data processors. Because users of algorithms; such as banks, 
insurance companies, or courts, depend on their customers’ and citizens’ trust, 
making use of inscrutable algorithms whose decision-logic defies human compre-
hension has negative implications for cooperation.
Furthermore, opacity makes oversight, comprehension, interpretation, and control 
quite impossible. If an algorithm and its decisionmaking logic cannot be adequately 
interpreted and understood, the resulting decisions cannot be controlled, tested, 
and investigated. Both the concrete logic behind a decision and the wider implica-
tions of using a certain model in the algorithm potentially remain opaque and are 
therefore hidden from control and oversight.
Algorithmic opacity, hampering accessibility and comprehensibility, also stands 
in the way of informational privacy.27,28 If the basic elements on which a decision 
against a person is based are inscrutable and defy accessibility and control, the per-
son loses the capacity to control what is known and who knows it. Moreover, people 
can no longer control what is done with the information available if they does not 
know what information exists in the first place. This has implications for autonomy 
as well. People who do not have knowledge of, or control over. their data, namely 
its acquisition and processing, might be restricted, or even restrict themselves pre-
emptively, in their choices, and, therefore, suffer a decrease of autonomy.
Inscrutability, but also inconclusiveness, are often related to questions of discrimina-
tion, because not knowing how an algorithm works makes it harder to detect or locate 
biases and, consequently, to find solutions to address these possible shortcomings. 
Finally, through algorithmic discrimination, existing inequalities might be reinforced, 
leading to less autonomy and participation on the part of the discriminated groups and 
persons. An example of the reinforcement of inequalities might be a case in which 
homeless people did not receive assistance because an algorithm made the assump-
tion that someone who had been in prison previously cannot be homeless.29
Solutions
Several scholars have nonetheless pointed out a number of possible solutions to 
these problems. First, there is the relatively intuitive idea of creating transparency 
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as a means to overcome opacity and other shortcomings. However the usefulness 
of transparency in itself can also be questioned, with the argument that transpar-
ency is often neither necessary nor sufficient for accountability in algorithmic 
decisionmaking.30 Transparency itself may not even be the most desirable goal. 
Additional technological instruments are suggested to provide accountability 
instead. Transparency can be created either by making explicit input–output rela-
tions such that the algorithm only produces results that are expected beforehand. 
This, however, would amount actually to not using machine-learning algorithms 
altogether because, almost by definition, machine learning defies the inclusion of 
fixed decisionmaking criteria.31 The problem is that if algorithms are programmed 
in this manner, their effectiveness might be reduced.
Alternatively, algorithms can also be tested and licensed by third parties, also 
known as auditing.32,33 The auditing approach might be useful in the case of effec-
tive machine- learning algorithms that remain opaque, sometimes even to experts.
Moreover, implementing an explanation module that exposes the decisionmaking 
of the algorithm “post-hoc” in humanly understandable terms might be another 
way to address opacity in machine-learning algorithms.34,35 This solution has the 
problem of potentially leading to false reassurance or at least to an incomplete 
understanding if supposedly humanly comprehensible explanations are given. 
Public education in programming, code writing, and computational thinking in 
general represents a further path toward enhancing people’s awareness and sen-
sitivity to algorithms, and therefore toward creating oversight and control. The 
use of open source software might also contribute to this end.36
With the aim of avoiding discrimination, further technological solutions are discussed; 
for example, programming without discriminating factors.37 Finally, other innova-
tive approaches have been suggested to resolve the responsibility gap. These 
approaches tend to presuppose that not only humans can act morally or be respon-
sible, and thus suggest a framework for programming moral competence in robots 
or of devising a means to implement moral reasoning in machines.38,39,40,41
The ethics of algorithms debate has identified a number of epistemic and result-
ing ethical concerns and has provided some possible solutions for these concerns. 
In the following, we will address the question of if and how these concerns and 
solutions can be used to shed light on the ethics of BCIs.
Algorithms and the Ethics of BCIs
Algorithms and Ethical Concerns Regarding BCIs
The ethics of algorithms debate shows how algorithmic opacity creates problems 
in BCIs as well. The evidence created by BCI algorithms can be inscrutable, because 
their working mechanisms are somewhat opaque. Moreover, the evidence can 
also be inconclusive. In the case of BCIs, the “evidence” in question is the identifi-
cation of relevant brain signals (filtering out all artefacts) and their classification 
by the algorithm; for example, as a certain intention or affective state. Thus, algo-
rithms create evidence for the conclusion that a certain state of mind in the user 
has occurred. In most cases, this evidence is directly transmitted to the output 
device; for example, an exoskeleton, a wheelchair, or a communication device. 
This kind of evidence is opaque to the extent that the particular decision-logic 
defies understanding on part of the user, and it is inconclusive to the extent that 
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there is a degree of uncertainty attached to the identification and classification of 
brain states.
It can be argued, however, that opacity in BCIs is not as relevant a question as it 
is in other algorithms. In BCIs, algorithms only use a relatively narrow set of data. 
The purpose of their use is, as stated previously, to identify relevant brain signals, 
classify them, and correlate them with a certain output. Compared with the huge 
amount of data acquired by, for example, a credit rating algorithm, the volume of 
BCI data is rather low. Thus, the range of possible outcomes that need to be under-
stood is limited.
Moreover, contrary to algorithms in general, in BCI use, the user (i.e., the one 
who uses an algorithm to make decisions), and the entity mostly dealing with the 
effects of the algorithm, is one and the same person. In other contexts considered 
in the debate around algorithmic decisions, algorithms are used by one party 
(such as a bank, an employer, a court) to make decisions about another party 
(e.g., a person wishing to get credit, an applicant for a job, or an offender in a trial). 
If a person or passer-by sees a problem emerging with the algorithm in these cases, 
that person might complain directly to the respective user and ask for an explana-
tion or, ultimately, the two parties might mutually agree that not using the algo-
rithm is the preferred option in certain contexts. The consequences of algorithmic 
opacity seem thus to differ qualitatively in BCI use. A quadriplegic person who 
uses a BCI to direct a wheelchair is both the user of an algorithm and the recipient 
of its use, because it is that person who experiences the algorithm’s outcomes. 
Moreover, in the case of BCIs, the algorithms are more closely linked to the action 
that the user wishes to perform, compared with other contexts of algorithm use (as 
in the case of a credit-rating algorithm). The problem of opacity seems, therefore, 
to be less far-reaching in BCIs. A BCI user cannot simply complain to another 
party because of the lack of transparency of an algorithm and ask or demand that 
the algorithm not be utilized in certain contexts. This picture and its related ethical 
consequences change again, if third parties are also involved through the BCI use, 
as might be the case if a wheelchair controlled by a BCI hits another person who 
happens to stand aside.
None of these thought experiments deny the opaque and inconclusive nature of 
the algorithms in BCIs as such. The algorithm’s output, that is, a particular move-
ment of the BCI-directed exoskeleton or wheelchair, might still be “surprising” 
or opaque for the user, precisely because the formation of that movement must be 
attributed to the algorithm whose decisionmaking process remains opaque. It is 
true that some amount of training is needed to enable a user to control an external 
device via the BCI, but presumably there remains a degree of uncertainty at least 
in some cases. This dynamic demonstrates that the inscrutable and inconclusive 
nature of algorithmic decisions in BCIs can be reframed as a safety problem. The 
BCI literature has addressed this problem as the trade-off between speed and 
accuracy: the longer an algorithm can do its work, the better the results of identi-
fication and classification.42 Increasing BCI accuracy through training, however, 
is an often frustrating endeavor and can lead to a lack of trust in BCIs.43 This 
would have serious implications for further studies in improving BCIs, with 
serious repercussions for those who stand to benefit from these technological 
advancements.
Algorithmic opacity is at the core of other problems that have been identified 
with BCIs, with one among these being privacy, for example. At first sight, the 
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issue of privacy as a right to control access to one’s data,44 is touched only to the 
extent that data are shared with third parties, because BCI algorithms are tailored 
to the individual brain. However, one might consider the case of a passive BCI that 
detects brain states unknown to the individual, and imagine that the BCI acts 
accordingly. For example, a BCI might detect a negative affective state during an 
interaction with another person. This might indeed become a privacy-related issue 
because it questions the individual person’s capacity to control access to that per-
son’s core personality. In a sense, it is no longer the person who has privileged 
access, but the BCI. The BCI user shares effective control and access with the 
algorithms.
Such questions raised by the use of the algorithmically fixed BCIs have direct 
implications for the notion of autonomy. It rapidly becomes a questionable matter 
whether or not people are autonomous if they do not have privileged knowledge 
about the mental states that drive their motivations and actions. If algorithms are 
used to detect brain states and to inform an external device to perform a certain 
task, this might be seen as enhancing autonomy for those who cannot perform 
that task otherwise. But autonomy can also be reduced in BCI use if people have 
no insight into and control over the resulting effects of their activities with a BCI. 
Furthermore, if there is a constant mismatch between what users believe about 
their mental state, and what the BCI detects, users’ self-concept might be confused 
to an extent that their ability for self-determination is ultimately diminished. 
Somewhat paradoxically, individually tailored algorithms could be designed to 
enhance autonomy by opening a path toward real self-knowledge, enabling peo-
ple to find their “true” preferences, or deepest emotions. However, if users are not 
in the epistemic position to discern their real selves when the BCI gives outputs 
that are not clearly understood or expected, then autonomy may be significantly 
reduced.
A further aspect for ethical consideration is that the evidence generated by a BCI 
algorithm is often incomplete. Imagine that a person’s BCI system detects that 
the person feels uneasy and therefore stops the person’s wheelchair automatically. 
Whether the uneasiness was meant to be the action-guiding mental state is an 
open question. It seems that the question of which mental state should be consid-
ered as “action guiding,” needs to be well defined prior to using a BCI, if a person 
wants to stay autonomous.
Because algorithmic opacity is said to contribute to biases and discrimination, 
the question arises whether opacity is observable in BCIs as well. Discrimination 
in BCIs appears to be not as clear-cut as in other cases. What could emerge as “dis-
crimination” is a bias in the ability to use BCIs. As Wilhelm Bauer and Mathias 
Vukelic discuss,45 elderly people exhibit differences in their assessment of negative 
emotions compared with younger people. This has an impact on older people’s 
neural correlates of affectivity, which makes it more difficult to detect affective 
brain states that then are informing a passive BCI. If these results are confirmed in 
future studies, the problem of opacity for elderly BCI users is increased, and, more 
fundamentally, using a BCI will not be open to everybody on an equal level. To 
state that this is a problem requires evidence to the extent that people have a right 
to use such a technology, or have a vital interest in it. One could argue that should 
BCIs be used widely in society one day, the unequal ability to use a BCI constitutes 
a disadvantage. As Guglielmo Tamburrini46 notes, unequal access to BCIs because 
of personal variations in BCI proficiency might raise questions of healthcare justice. 
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The workplace context is another area in which the age-based tendency to be 
unable to use BCIs could pose serious problems of discrimination. Note, however, 
that in this case, the ethical problem is not one that arises out of a working algo-
rithm’s inherent bias (wherever it comes from), but one of an algorithm being 
unusable for a given population. This adds a particular aspect to BCI ethics that 
goes beyond what the ethics of algorithms has offered so far.
Potential Solutions
Algorithmic transparency has been put forward as a solution to decrease the level 
of opacity; to increase trust, understanding and oversight, privacy, and autonomy; 
and to reduce bias and discrimination. One particular means to achieve transpar-
ency would be to refrain from using machine-learning algorithms altogether. This, 
however, would most probably lead to less effective BCIs.
A more promising approach would likely involve making the algorithm’s 
model interpretable post-hoc; namely, by explaining the decision logic and work-
ing mechanism after a particular decision has been made. One can imagine that 
BCI users gradually learn about the algorithm and its working mechanism 
through behavioral, but also explanatory feedback, and can subsequently adapt 
to it. However, whether this is the case depends on the individual’s ability to 
understand computational issues, and it makes room for potential discrimina-
tion because it limits the range of people who could understand and subse-
quently use BCIs with more insight. Post-hoc explanation might even lead to a 
false assurance and reliance on algorithms, potentially causing harm at a later 
point in time.47 If a BCI repeatedly explains its decision, the user might increas-
ingly trust the technology and lose the awareness that the technology could still 
be prone to making errors.
As a further option, auditing has been proposed as a solution to the problem of 
inscrutable evidence and opacity. Auditing does appear to be highly useful for BCIs. 
Trusted auditors such as researchers or external regulators could (be required to) 
analyze algorithms and either make them explainable or certify their acceptability. 
These auditors could examine cases of BCI uses and see how reliably the algo-
rithms work (e.g., ex-post audit studies). They could run simulations or use algo-
rithm internal reporting mechanisms. All these audits leave the black box model 
intact; that is, they do not attempt to understand the algorithm, but rather prove 
its reliability and verify correct functioning. However, more research is needed to 
find practical ways of conducting audits of BCIs, particularly because some of the 
scenarios envisaged here do not even exist yet.
Education in programming and coding has been put forward as yet another 
means to counter inscrutable evidence, and is also applicable in the case of BCIs. 
However, knowledge about programming is a rather generic solution that does 
not guarantee that a particular algorithm and its particular decisions are under-
stood. And if some machine-learning algorithms are said to remain opaque even 
to experts, by extension this will hold true for educated BCI users. Using open 
source codes and software will not improve BCI transparency, because it is typi-
cally not the BCI user who elaborates on the BCI’s algorithm.
Given the opacity of a BCI algorithm and the impact of this question of opacity 
on safety, privacy, and autonomy, it might be useful to implement measures that 
locate the final say as to what action the technological device performs with the 
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user. A veto right to intervene in the BCI-mediated action can be justified on these 
grounds, through implementing an emergency stop. This is, at root, a technical 
question that affects the design of the algorithm. The case appears to be that algo-
rithms need to be created that do not only detect and classify brain signals, but 
also leave control over the action with the user. This distinguishes BCI algorithms 
from other, non-BCI instances of using algorithms. Here, users have control over 
the algorithms because they are the ones to decide whether or not to use an algo-
rithm for a certain task; for example, to decide whether people who apply for 
credit can be granted their wish. There is no need to talk of a special veto right 
here, because the user would have the veto right in the first place (to use or not 
use an algorithm). One part of the explanation is that the action of interest here 
does not rely on algorithms. To decide whether an applicant should receive 
credit does not need to make use of algorithms. The decision can be made using 
various other means. In BCIs, however, the algorithm directly connects with the 
intention-generating and, therefore, action-initiating processes within a person’s 
brain. A BCI is constitutive of an action and not merely a replaceable instrument. 
Therefore, a veto right appears to be necessary in BCIs, which complements 
what some authors have termed the “right to explanation” in the case of other 
algorithms.
With regard to the discriminatory elements in BCIs, available remedies do not 
directly target the algorithm and its design. Rather, these elements appeal to the 
way that those who put the BCI algorithm to use in the real world have to com-
pensate for the resulting harms. It could include mandatory provisions of alternative 
means that those with less or no BCI proficiency can use. The workplace context is 
one area in which age-based tendency toward being unable to use BCIs could pose 
serious problems of discrimination. Technological solutions could be provided by 
taking into account the age-bias and program algorithms accordingly. Political 
instruments might be applicable here, too; for example, that using BCIs as automa-
tion tools in factories could require paying an extra tax.
On a more general level, the debate about the ethics of algorithms has also 
revealed various reinterpretations and reallocations of responsibility as a solution 
to the responsibility gap. One way is to maintain that there remains some portion 
of responsibility with designers and developers of algorithms to test their algo-
rithms and to care for epistemic justification as well as nondiscrimination. It might 
be interesting and fruitful to approach this question from the perspective of corpo-
rate social responsibility48 (CSR) or even political corporate social responsibility49 
(PSCR) so as to include a broader range of potential bearers of responsibility. This 
approach would introduce a debate that has a long-standing experience with ethically 
assessing market behavior and could shed new light on designing and selling 
medical devices.
As a final note, an entirely novel way to evaluate user responsibility might be 
necessary. This is reflected by attempts to conceptualize the notion of responsibil-
ity toward BCI-mediated actions as being analogous to the scenario of interaction 
with animals. To explain, similarly to the case of the owner of a domestic animal, 
the BCI user does not always know how the algorithm will eventually “act” or 
behave. Nonetheless, the owner has responsibility for the results of the interaction 
of the animal. Whether harmful or unwanted results occur depends on the knowl-
edge, the virtues, or the morality of the user, or on other factors at least partially 
and sufficiently under the control of the user.
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Conclusion
In this article, we have raised the central question of whether concerns raised in 
the general ethical debates about algorithms can be transferred to ethical discus-
sions of BCIs. Our second goal was to see whether some of the solutions offered in 
the debate about the ethics of algorithms can be used to regulate BCIs as well.
The algorithms used in BCIs account for some of the problems identified with 
algorithms generally. For example, algorithmic opacity and inconclusiveness con-
tribute to the safety problems associated with BCIs that do not work reliably. In 
addition, trust in BCI (and potentially in BCI research) might decrease. Moreover, 
to the extent that algorithms reliably identify and classify mental processes and 
states, this can lead to a problem concerning privacy and autonomy, because it is 
the algorithm and not the person that can be said to have privileged knowledge of 
the person’s most personal states. Discrimination through BCIs is another issue 
that can be traced back to algorithms, but, importantly, this is caused by the algorithm 
not being usable for certain classes of users. This again raises important autonomy- 
and justice-related problems.
We have furthermore discussed various possible solutions to these concerns 
with algorithms. Restricting the use of algorithms or even of BCIs more generally 
in certain contexts and applications, and auditing, as well as a broader concept of 
responsibility, are part of the suggested solutions.
Future research needs to focus on particular ethical problems caused by algo-
rithms and determine what solutions are available. For example, because some 
authors have argued that there is a responsibility gap caused by increased autono-
mous decisionmaking capacities of machines, the question arises as to what role 
algorithms play in this context. Some scholars have already noted the problem of 
traceability with regard to algorithms so that a deeper engagement with these 
ideas is called for. Moreover, some of the solutions to the problems with algo-
rithms discussed previously need further investigation. For example, making use 
of CSR needs to be explored in a more detailed manner. This will allow a richer 
understanding of how ethical issues can be solved, and how responsibilities need 
to be allocated, respectively. It will thus enrich our understanding of the ethics of 
BCIs and its solutions.
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